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S U M M A R Y
The pneumonic plague, which spread across Northeast China during the winter of 1910 and spring of
1911, caused numerous deaths and brought about severe social turmoil. After compulsory quarantine
and other epidemic prevention measures were enforced by Dr Wu Lien-teh, the epidemic was brought to
an end within 4 months. This article reviews the ways in which the plague was dealt with from a
historical perspective, based on factors such as clinical manifestations, duration of illness, case fatality
rate, degree of transmissibility, poverty, inadequate healthcare infrastructure, and the region’s recent
strife-ﬁlled history. Similarities were sought between the pneumonic plague in Northeast China in the
twentieth century and the Ebola virus outbreak that is currently ravaging Africa, and an effort made to
summarize the ways in which speciﬁc measures were applied successfully to ﬁght the earlier epidemic.
Our efforts highlight valuable experiences that are of potential beneﬁt in helping to ﬁght the current
rampant Ebola epidemic in West Africa.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Epidemics have played a signiﬁcant role during the last one
thousand years of human civilization. In the fourteenth century,
the Black Death killed a quarter of the population of Europe. From
the ﬁfteenth to the eighteenth century, smallpox swept through
the whole of Europe. Moreover, between 1840 and 1862, cholera
devastated populations worldwide. Many epidemics have taken
place since the beginning of the twentieth century, including
Spanish ﬂu, HIV/AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
bird ﬂu, and the Ebola outbreak currently raging in West Africa. The
Ebola virus is especially deadly, given its high fatality rate and
transmissibility.
Occurring from October 1910 to April 1911, the pneumonic
plague epidemic in Northeast China has been termed the worst
epidemic of the twentieth century, as it was a disaster in terms of the
lives of the people and the economy of Northern China. Even though
it occurred nearly one hundred years ago, for many researchers, the
disastrous pneumonic plague that took more than 60 000 lives
remains worthy of study. It was this pneumonic plague epidemic that
really instigated the earliest scientiﬁc epidemic prevention work* Corresponding authors.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).in modern China. Analysis of the organization and management
efforts, including medical care, epidemic prevention, and effects of
quarantine, provide important information for later generations.
The recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa presents many
similarities to the plague that happened in Northeast China
(Manchuria) in the twentieth century, such as issues related to the
economy, culture, health systems, and other background environ-
ments. For example, Manchuria had been suffering wars and
poverty, and the health infrastructure was inadequate, just like the
West Africa of today. A further similarity is that the particularly
devastating courses of these two epidemics have been attributed to
the biological characteristics of the virus. It is more likely that these
are the result of the combination of dysfunctional health systems,
international indifference, high population mobility, local customs,
densely populated capitals, and a lack of trust in the authorities
following years of armed conﬂict.
Summarizing the successful experiences in ﬁghting the pneu-
monic plague in Northeast China a hundred years ago is of relevance
in the effort against the current spread of Ebola in West Africa.
2. Wu Lien-teh’s ﬁght against pneumonic plague
In the autumn of 1910 and spring of 1911, a deadly disease
broke out in Fuchiatien (Fujiadian, now Daowai District of Harbin),
the Chinese sector of Harbin in northern Manchuria. Those whociety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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with blood-streaked sputum and a purplish skin discoloration;
death followed within a few days. The ﬁrst victims of the pneumonic
plague were marmot trappers and fur traders in Manzhouli, along
the Siberian border. The plague spread rapidly, especially in the
Harbin area; in two provinces – Jilin and Heilongjiang – a total of
39 679 people died, accounting for 1.7% of the population of the two
provinces.1 At that time, Japan and Russia were on the ground,
controlling the plague epidemic, and were attempting to infringe
upon the territorial sovereignty of Northeast China.
In this complex situation, the Chinese government instructed
Wu Lien-teh to head for the plague-affected areas. By strengthen-
ing railway quarantine, controlling trafﬁc, isolating the epicenter
of the plague, cremating victims’ bodies, and many other measures,
and by facilitating collaboration between the Chinese and foreign
governments and doctors, Wu Lien-teh ﬁnally quelled the
pneumonic plague. It was the largest infectious disease to spread
through China in the twentieth century, occurring over less than
4 months. This was the ﬁrst ever recorded cooperation between
scientiﬁc prevention experts and government bodies to effectively
control a large plague in China.
Wu showed tremendous leadership during the time when he
was in command of the Manchurian plague control efforts, gaining
him international fame.2–5 His University of Cambridge, Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine, and Pasteur Institute training enabled
him to mediate the medical approaches of Chinese and Western
scientists. As a Chinese ofﬁcial abroad, he identiﬁed with China’s
quest for modernity through Western medicine. Wu Lien-teh
founded the Binjiang Medical School (the predecessor of Harbin
Medical University) based on the Northeast Epidemic Affairs
Department and the equipment and technology of Binjiang
Hospital in September 1926.
3. Summary of the plague experience to help support the
control of Ebola
3.1. Comparison of backgrounds
From the measures adopted by Wu Lien-teh during the ﬁght
against the plague, we can see that these historical populations had a
systematic and comprehensive understanding of the measures
required to treat plague. Although today’s society and the conditions
of medical care have changed immensely, the Ebola outbreak has
been a wake-up call, causing people to think again about the
epidemic conditions occurring in a modern society and to refocus on
new diseases that threaten global health under these new conditions.
On April 1, 1911, when the plague had not yet been completely
extinguished in the Northeast of China, The North China Herald
(published in Shanghai) published an article written on March 10,
sent from the newsletter, which stated that this was the ﬁrst time
in Chinese history that Western methods had been adopted in the
ﬁght against plague. Considering their situation, they should be
praised; the people had learned a terrible lesson and profoundly
believed that these methods could save their lives. As such, it is
necessary to learn from past populations, from which we can ﬁnd
the commonalities and understand the implications to deal with
the crises of today.6
A comparison of the background environment between the
pneumonic plague in Northeast China and the Ebola outbreak in
West Africa is given in Table 1.
3.2. Experience and implications
The history of the ﬁght against plague has resulted in the
accumulation of a wealth of knowledge on epidemic prevention.
Systematically exploring history shows not only respect fortraditional culture, but is also an important way to explore the
direction of development for the future. Using a variety of
measures, applied appropriately, the Northeast China pneumonic
plague epidemic, which resulted in as many as 60 000 deaths and
shocked the world in the early twentieth century, was successfully
halted in less than 4 months. In April 1911, an article published in
China’s most important church publication, ‘Senate Magazine’ (The
Chinese Recorder), also stated that the Chinese people should be
commended for using the Western way to combat the plague for
the ﬁrst time.7–9
It can be seen that on the frontline of ﬁghting disease, there is no
absolute authority. Combining the essence of Western medicine
with the prevailing situation and people’s awareness, and putting
scientiﬁc ideas into practice, is ultimately the key to victory in the
battle to prevent epidemics. Wu’s study experience brought an
outsider’s perspective, free from the tradition of China’s medical
practices. Breaking cultural boundaries, in spite of prejudice and
the questioning of foreign experts, and using his solid medical
knowledge and clinical experience, he won the battle. His methods
have become standard in the control of highly infectious diseases,
and some of the measures in his response to the plague are highly
indicated for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
3.2.1. Heightening of the government’s attention – calling for a strong
government
Early on during the plague epidemic, the Qing Dynasty did not
comprehend the gravity of the situation; it was during this time that
Japan and Russia were on the ground controlling the spread of the
plague epidemic and attempting to infringe upon the territorial
sovereignty of Northeast China. In the face of the complex positions
of interest and interactions between China, Japan, and Russia, the
Qing government realized that the control of the development of this
epidemic was not simply one event, but was a large-scale issue
involving the national sovereignty and dignity of the people. The
proposals of Japan and Russia were ﬂat-out rejected, and Wu was
instructed to head for the plague-affected areas.
Due to the neglect of the Qing government to pay sufﬁcient
attention to the epidemic early on, the epidemic was quite
rampant and was spreading southward. The severity of the
epidemic, the violation of sovereignty, as well as the nation’s
peril, allowed the central authorities of the Qing Dynasty and local
ofﬁcials to fully appreciate the urgency of the epidemic.10–13
Decisively implementing positive responses such as providing
relief, tax exemptions, medicines, and other rewards played a very
important role in controlling the epidemic, in resuming economic
production, and encouraging the people. Seen in this light, in order
to effectively control the Ebola epidemic, there is a need for strong
government intervention; should the government assume corre-
sponding responsibility and actively organize people to mobilize
ﬁnancial resources, the effects would be immeasurable.
Nowadays, with the rapid progression of the Ebola epidemic,
reliance solely on governments for its control constitutes a
signiﬁcant global health problem. This is particularly the case in
countries like those in West Africa, in which governments that are
relatively weak cannot rely on their own actions alone to win the
battle against the Ebola epidemic. The world needs strong World
Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations (UN) governance
to provide technical leadership and operational support to
governments and partners in Ebola control efforts.14 The Ebola
crisis delivers a powerful message regarding the consequences of
the weakening of the WHO, once the leading organization in public
health policy-making.15
Today, the WHO is increasingly weak technically, politically,
and ﬁnancially. Failures in leadership have allowed a preventable
disease to spin out of control, with extensive harm to social order
and human dignity. Ebola has reached the point where it could
Table 1
Comparison of the background environment between the pneumonic plague in Northeast China and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa
Pneumonic plague Ebola
Source of infection In the early twentieth century, driven by economic interests, a
large number of sick marmots were hunted. Hunters ate the
infected meat and became ill, after which the epidemic spread
quickly along the railroad (because the construction of the
Chinese Eastern Railway made Harbin an accessible city); the
plague virus then impacted on the Northeast Plain.
The epidemic has been caused by the Ebola virus (Zaire species).
The mortality rate in people infected by this virus is up to 90%. Poor
people searching for resources, looking for the wood used to make
carbon or mineral mining, may have acquired the virus when
searching for these in the depths of the forest. Local people go into
the most remote corners of the forest, which increases the risk of
exposure to the Ebola virus.
Epidemiologists and virus experts believe the epidemic spread to
Liberia from Guinea as a result of travel, because, for example, if
someone were to visit the site of a death and then take a bus they
could bring the Ebola virus into contact with family members.
Transmission routes Pneumonic plague can spread between people through saliva
and air droplets, without the need for a murine transmission
vector such as a mouse (originally the public and doctors did
not understand its transmission route).
Infection can spread through close contact with blood, secretions,
or other body ﬂuids of the infected animals. Ebola virus can spread
between two people, mainly due to the exposure of healthy people
to infected blood, secretions, or other body ﬂuids, or by indirect
contact with the environment polluted by the contaminated body
ﬂuids.
Epidemic area Fuchiatien (now Daowai District of Harbin), the Chinese sector
of Harbin in northern Manchuria,
Heilongjiang Province, Jilin Province, Korea, Japan
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and other West
African countries, and Spain and other European countries. The
international spread is through modern transport.
Time of breakout From October 1910 to April 1911; the plague was controlled in
4 short months.
Guinea’s ﬁrst Ebola case was identiﬁed in November 2013 when the
dry season began. In other countries, outbreaks also started
between the rainy and dry season period.
Politics The Chinese underwent an increasingly severe national crisis;
the corrupt Qing government capitulated to turn traitors for
personal gain, and there was brutal internal repression of the
people’s revolution. The imperialist powers ravaged the land of
China, carving up China’s territory. The northeast was an area of
ﬁerce competition for imperialism; it was the place where there
was a particularly grave national crisis.
Situations of political unrest and even the use of force to resolve
political conﬂicts. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are three
countries that have been involved in military crises and decade-
long civil wars. Governments failed to play a leadership role in
resolving the wars, leading to continued political chaos.
Economy The economy of the Northeast was relatively backward; there
was a large population and a shortage of resources in all
respects, particularly medicine. The plague caused panic both
related to survival and economic life.
West Africa is one of the poorest regions of the world. More than
half of the Guinean population lives below the poverty line, and
about 20% of the population are in extreme poverty. With regard to
Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United Nations human development
index ranks these at 174 and 177, respectively.
Cultural environment Funeral: the Chinese traditional view was that ‘people should
have graves in the land’.
Social atmosphere: The people suffered the dual pressures of
the epidemic and society; there was a pessimistic atmosphere
surrounding society.
Funeral: Burial customs are prevalent; at the funeral, people must
stroke and kiss the dead body before burial.
Social atmosphere: The people are suffering from the pain and
turmoil of war.
Health
system
The health regime was dispersed with no unity; the
professional quality of health administrative staff was low;
competent leaders did not pay attention; more importance was
attached to treatment than prevention.
Weak systems have not prepared the population to deal with
outbreaks; preparation and basic medical resources are very scarce.
Number of deaths A total of 57 353 people died: 3800 in Changchun and mid-long
road; 20 264 in 22 counties and cities in Jilin; 27 434 in 22 cities
and counties in Heilongjiang; 5855 in 26 counties and cities in
Liaoning.
Up to December 3, 2014, there had been a total of 12 000 cases, with
7000 deaths.
Mortality 89.52% (initially two people died, and then the daily death toll
rose to 200 people; at the end of the plague, nobody died.)
71% (90% daily death toll, upwards of 200 people)
Difﬁculties in
epidemic control
There were ﬁnancial difﬁculties; there was little preparation for
hospital isolation; transportation was difﬁcult; the burning of
corpses and isolation of goods was difﬁcult; there was a
decentralized regime without a uniﬁed health system; the
quality of health administrative staff was low; competent
leaders did not pay attention; more importance was attached to
treatment than to prevention; drugs were insufﬁcient.
Fear of the disease has led to hospital closures and the ﬂeeing of
health care workers; laboratory equipment and capacity are weak,
and there is a lack of capacity for early identiﬁcation and diagnosis;
there has been a failure to establish effective tracking of contacts
and isolation mechanisms; publicity and education have been poor,
making it difﬁcult to contact people in poor communities;
outbreaks have occurred in densely populated regions; the three
major infective countries have resisted border activities.
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inadequate and late global response. Not only did it take more than
3 months to diagnose Ebola as the cause of the epidemic—in
contrast to the recent outbreak in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, where it took a matter of days—but it was not until
5 months and 1000 deaths later that a public health emergency
was declared, and it was nearly another 2 months before a
humanitarian response was put into action.16 The global commu-
nity should take responsibility for strengthening skilled manpower
and infrastructure capacity in low-resource countries to effectively
prevent and control diseases and make the world a safer place.
Major failures in governance and leadership could be rectiﬁed if
lessons are learned from Ebola.173.2.2. National linkage and strengthening international cooperation –
format of a quarantine center
During the ﬁght against the plague in the twentieth century, the
Qing government, both central and local, began to come to a
consensus on the formation of a central health and epidemic
prevention organization. Wu showed tremendous leadership in
allocating doctors, police, and the general population to perform
activities of epidemic prevention, in transforming schools,
theaters, baths, temples, and churches into emergency hospitals,
and in organizing huge convoys, training sessions, and the
mobilization of the people (including speciﬁc industry service
personnel). Wu Lien-teh became the control center of the entire
action against the epidemic. In addition, the Qing government also
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prevention, including establishing a quarantine partnership with
Japan and Russia; foreign physicians were also hired directly to
work in prevention.
The continued spread of the Ebola virus threatens West Africa
and the rest of the world, making outbreak containment a global
health priority. West African countries suffer from poverty and are
underdeveloped; as such, they cannot rely on their own strength to
control Ebola.18,19 They need strong support from the international
community in order to defeat the proliferation of the virus. The
head of the WHO has called the epidemic the most severe acute
public health emergency in modern times. Now that the world has
woken up to the danger, the task is to collaborate as a whole to stop
the Ebola epidemic.
3.2.3. Isolation prevention system
With the approaching Lunar New Year celebrations, there was a
risk of epidemic spread when individuals from plague-affected
areas travelled to their hometowns in different regions.20 Dr Wu
Lien-teh implemented disease population surveys and the
immediate hospital transfer of persons suspected of infection;
suspected cases were placed under observation and conﬁrmed
cases were placed in quarantine. Eventually, the problem of the
densely populated, pestilence-ridden area was overcome. The
isolation of principle patients, the wearing of masks, segmented
martial law, and disinfection by burning the dead (brought about
by Dr Wu Lien-teh) were the main methods used in China to
combat SARS in 2003, and are still in use.
In today’s ﬁght against Ebola, governments should pay more
attention to applying isolation measures; however, whether or not
the infected area should be isolated completely from other regions
is controversial. Many experts believe that the use of these
measures in West Africa would be both wrong and futile. Borders
are permeable. People would ﬂee the area by way of bribes because
of food shortages or psychological isolation. As the virus has spread
unchecked across West Africa, other untraceable emigrants may
carry it inside their bodies as they cross borders. Therefore, the
WHO recommends that ‘‘response activities must be adapted in
areas of very intense transmission and particular attention must be
given to stopping transmission in capital cities, thereby facilitating
the larger response and relief effort. If non-essential movement in
and out of a containment area is stopped, ensure that essential
movement (e.g. for response providers, essential services) con-
tinues unhindered. To facilitate Ebola virus disease (EVD) response,
defer mass gatherings until intensity of transmission is reduced.’’21
3.2.4. Strict quarantine system
The Qing Dynasty’s ﬁrst cases of plague occurred in the Chinese
territory of Manchuria by the overtaking of Russia’s Siberia. On
October 26, the ﬁrst victims of the plague were discovered at
Manchuria station. A total distance of 530 miles east of the
Dongqing and Zhongdong railroads became the major thorough-
fare to Harbin from Manchuria. As a result of social progress,
foreign exchange had increased and the opportunity for interac-
tions between countries and regions was also increasing. However,
this also increased the possibility of the spread of the epidemic
between regions and countries. Therefore, the establishment and
implementation of the prevention of infectious diseases was
crucial. Medical staff from cosmopolitan centers were selected to
conduct quarantine inspections along the main routes of
transmission of the epidemic – railway and steamship routes –
and to set up a temporary hospital at the station, if necessary,
cutting off outbound trafﬁc from the infected area. The develop-
ment and implementation of this quarantine system was in part to
avoid the spread of disease among regions, but also to avoid the
spread between countries.22–24Today, the situation is far from comparable to that with regard
to the historical travel/transport system. However, the spread of
disease may also have been helped by urbanization and develop-
ment, which have strengthened transport links resulting in the
virus being shuttled from villages to the town and back into
uninfected areas. Nevertheless, the WHO has not called for a ban on
travel, instead recommending that travelers leaving affected
countries be screened on departure for fever and anyone suspected
of carrying the virus. A comprehensive travel ban would cause
economic hardship, but the situation regarding migrant workers
from countries with an increasingly uncontrollable epidemic will
increase the risk of the international spread of Ebola.25 Thus, in
today’s situation of economic globalization, although we cannot
completely restrict trafﬁc (as in historical times), we are able to
support the strict implementation of precautionary measures,
providing the necessary medical treatment for the crew and
passengers involved in air travel and those handling cargo shipped
to and from affected areas, and imposing strict quarantine for
disease prevention and control; we are also able to reduce the
isolation and economic hardship suffered by affected countries.
3.2.5. Breaking traditional concepts and practices
In late January 1911, Wu was horriﬁed to discover over
2000 unburied bodies. It was midwinter and the ground was
frozen solid, but Wu feared that when spring brought warmer
weather, the dead bodies would pose a serious public health risk.
It was also thought that rats rummaging among the bodies would
spread the infection. Mass cremation was the solution, but the
Chinese viewed this as an act of desecration.26 To overcome
this problem, Wu invited local ofﬁcials to visit the burial ground
and explained to them the health dangers. He then sent a
memorandum to the Emperor. After three anxious days, the
Imperial Edict allowing cremation arrived. On January 31, 1911,
the Chinese Lunar New Year, the ﬁrst mass cremation in Chinese
history began. Bodies that had previously been buried were also
dug up and cremated. Eventually, the mortality ﬁgures started to
decline and the disease ran its course.27 Dr Wu Lien-teh took
decisive measures to cremate corpses and ordered all the civil
and military ofﬁcials to watch, along with countless people. This
was the ﬁrst time in Chinese history that collective cremation
burial had ever happened.
In ancient folk culture and contemporary West African
countries, local customs related to the handling of illness and
funerals (to ask God to chase away ghosts), mean that measures
such as isolation and quarantine are not well implemented. These
archaic social attitudes and lifestyles have a negative effect on the
evasion of such epidemic disasters. The underdeveloped political
and economic situation in these countries, in addition to their
burial customs, has made it difﬁcult to avoid the limitations in
dealing with the Ebola epidemic. This has placed enormous
pressure on the governments. In the face of an epidemic and
possible death, we must resolutely abandon the shackles of
outdated viral prevention systems to avoid the spread of viruses
facilitated by the presence of corpses. Although speciﬁc practices
can be drawn from past experience, we can enforce cremation and
inform the public ofﬁcially of the dangers of the disease through
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), ordering all residents
to watch. Seeing the ﬁnal effects of the disease is likely to have a
great emotional impact on the population, and may spur initiatives
to abandon folk customs so that the positive role of cremation is
recognized in the context of containing Ebola.28
3.2.6. Positive guidance from the public media
The Northeast China plague not only caused numerous deaths,
it also impacted on overall survival and economic life. Information
was published in a large number of newspapers based on the
H. Liu et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 33 (2015) 222–226226national consciousness immunization theory and scientiﬁc knowl-
edge on health at the time, both to appease the psychological
tension of the populace but also to publicize knowledge of disease
prevention and control.
In reports on the battle against Ebola, media interest in the
outbreak raging throughout West Africa has not, so far, been
discussed widely or studied.29 Coverage of Ebola has, understand-
ably, been proliﬁc, but at times, narrow and unbalanced. To avoid
these situations, we need the media to provide a fair and true
platform to allow the public to obtain the most time-sensitive
information and be able to communicate on an equal footing, like
the newspapers during the ﬁght against the plague. We can also
learn from contemporary methods such as The Lancet Twitter chat,
a small but positive example that can show us the power and
potential of social media to inform and assist. During the chat, new
ideas emerged from experts and the audience alike. Only in ways
such as these can we ﬁnd valuable messages such as ‘‘local
solutions to local problems need Africans training Africans’’.
Scaling up the positive and constructive discussion of informed
media communication could remove boundaries between scien-
tists, health professionals, and policy-makers, creating a novel
diverse community, giving everyone a voice and an opportunity to
contribute. To create the right conditions to defeat Ebola, we need
increased global engagement, knowledge, and commitment.30
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